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Abstract
Road congestion in urban environments, especially near signalized intersec-
tions, has been a major cause of significant fuel and time waste. Various solutions
have been proposed to solve the problem of increasing idling times and number of
stops of vehicles at signalized intersections, ranging from infrastructure to vehicle-
based techniques. However, all the solutions introduced to solve the problem have
approached the problem from a single vehicle point of view. This research in-
troduces a game-theoretic cooperative speed optimization framework to minimize
vehicles’ idling times and number of stops at signalized intersections. This frame-
work consists of three modules to cover individual autonomous vehicle speed op-
timization; conflict recognition; and cooperative speed decision making. A time
token allocation algorithm is introduced through the proposed framework to allow
the vehicles to cooperate and agree on certain speed actions such that the average
idling times and number of stops are minimized. Simulation to test and validate
the proposed framework is conducted and results are reported.
1 Introduction
In the U.S. every year, 4.8 billion hours are wasted by traffic congestion [1]. Some
automobile industrial companies have made leaps toward manufacturing Autonomous
Vehicles (AVs), which can implement different levels of automatic functions as a means
of achieving a safer and more efficient transportation system [2–6]. Some research has
been conducted on optimal speed computation near Signalized Intersections (SIs) to
minimize the vehicles’ idling times and number of stops. [7] has proposed an algorithm
called Green Light Optimal Speed Advisory (GLOSA) to minimize the number of stop
times at SIs through a journey. The impacts of this algorithm on traffic efficiency and
average trip time were reported. The performance analysis of the same algorithm was
investigated again in [8] using the performance metrics of average fuel consumption
and average stop times at SIs.
[9] has introduced an approach for a single vehicle optimal speed computation to
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reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. In this approach though, the case of a
driver cruising his/her vehicle speed to pass a TL is not considered. [10] has used the
approach proposed in [9] to reduce CO2 emissions. Since [10] pays attention to the re-
duction of CO2 by reducing stop-and-go driving, the case where the driver may cruise
his/her vehicle speed to pass the TL is taken into account. [11] has investigated the
impacts of Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication, namely TL to vehicle com-
munication, on fuel and emission reductions. [12] has posed a speed advisory model
that computes a fuel-optimal speed profile during deceleration and acceleration phases
at SIs.
Game theory was introduced in the early years of the twentieth century in [13]
and [14]. It has been applied to some transportation problems, such as shortest path
and road congestion problems. [15] has proposed a shortest-path game with transfer-
able utility, focusing on the allocation of profits generated by the coalitions of play-
ers. [16] has presented a shortest-path game in which players own road segments in a
network. Each player in the game receives a non-negative reward if he/she transports a
good from the source to the destination. [17] has introduced a model in which players
who share resources (i.e., routes) can form coalitions to selfishly compete against each
other to maximize their values. [18] has discussed the similarities between cooperative
congestion games and their non-cooperative counterparts to demonstrate important is-
sues, such as the existence of and the convergence to a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
(NE).
Furthermore, game theory has been applied to the dynamic TL signal timing control
problem. [19] has introduced a model for TL system control based on Markov Chain
game with the objective of minimizing the queue lengths at multiple SIs. [20] has
proposed a two-player cooperation game for TL signal timing control applied to a two-
phase SI. Similar research to [19] is presented in [21] where a non-cooperative game
to model the TL signal timing control problem is introduced based on game theory and
modeled as a finite controlled Markov Chain. However, the TL model in [21] is applied
to a single SI. [22] has presented a game theory model based on Cournot’s Oligopoly
game. [23] has proposed a novel game theory optimization algorithm for TL signal
timing control. The Nash Bargaining (NB) is used to find the optimal strategy of the
TL signal timing.
Noticeably, all the techniques proposed for minimizing the idling times and number
of stops of vehicles approaching an SI have been limited to optimal speed computation
in which the vehicles individually and independently compute and update their optimal
speeds. In this research work, a Cooperative Speed Optimization Framework (CSOF)
is proposed. The proposed CSOF is designed to function on AVs of the highest level of
autonomy (i.e., the AV is completely autonomous and the driver does not take control
of the AV at any point in time). The cooperative notion of the CSOF is to allow the
AVs to interact with each other and agree on implementing certain speed actions when
approaching SIs. It relies on linear programming and game theory, consisting of three
modules to cover individual vehicle speed optimization, conflict recognition, and speed
optimization decision making. A time token allocation algorithm is proposed to be
embedded in the TL such that AVs are able to cooperate with each other and with the
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TL. Thus, the average idling times and number of stops at SIs are minimized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the problem of min-
imizing the idling times and number of stops of AVs approaching an SI as well as
addresses the game theory formulation toward the proposed solution. Section 3 in-
troduces the game theory cooperative framework, CSOF, proposed to minimize the
average idling times and number of stops of AVs. Section 4 poses the concept of coop-
erative bargaining. Section 5 presents the simulation environment and reports results
investigating the performance of the CSOF. Finally, concluding remarks and future
work recommendations are discussed in Section 6.
2 Problem Statement and Game-theoretic Formulation
2.1 Signalized Roadway Intersection Setting
Consider as a simple example the illustration of a two-lane, four-roadway SI (Fig. 1).
For simplicity, assume that the TL control system has a two-phase static cycle where
East and West roadways are one phase and North and South roadways are the other
phase. Each phase has a signal design of Green-Yellow-Red; however, for simplicity,
the yellow-light time is assumed to be part of the green-light-time duration. The key
TL parameters are the green-light-time duration Tg, the red-light-time duration Tr, and
the TL cycle duration Tc = Tg+Tr. These parameters are assumed to be constant, e.g.,
Tg = 24sec, Tr = 36sec, and Tc = 60sec. Assume that there is V2I communication such
that the vehicles heading toward the TL can receive signal timing information and that
every AV is conducting speed optimization re-planning to have a chance of meeting the
green-light time.
Definition 1 Speed optimization re-planning is a game in which each AV performs
speed optimization every time step t. There is a probability p that the AV will proceed
according to the previous strategy at time step t− 1 and a probability (1− p) that it
will move to a different strategy (i.e., adopt a different speed).
To clarify the complexity of the problem, assume that for a certain cycle, the arrival
and maximum departure rates of each roadway at the TL are λ = 0.25veh/sec and
µ = 0.333veh/sec, respectively [24]. Therefore, in this particular cycle, the number of
AVs arriving from each roadway during the red time is Narr = λTr =(0.25)(36)= 9veh,
while the maximum number of AVs that can depart the TL from each roadway during
the green time and whole cycle is Ndep = µTg = (0.333)(24) = 8veh.
Making this setting, assume that the TL has just turned green for the East-West
directions. Consider the case of two AVs travelling on the West roadway performing
speed optimization re-planning. Taking the queue size into account, according to the
computations by these AVs, each of them can pass within the current green light. Since
3
Figure 1: A simple example of a traffic light scenario.
only one AV can pass through, the other will experience an unexpected delay, waiting
for the next green light. Hence, AVs negatively impact the objectives of each other.
2.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a group of AVs travelling within a locality with m TLs. Each AV with in-
dex AVi contemplates speed optimization to minimize its idling times at TLs from
an initial location p0i to a final destination p f i. The trip from p0i to p f i is made on
a path, P(p0i, p f i), constructed from a set of road segments ending with TLs, L =
{L1,L2, . . . ,Lm}. The speed vi(t) of each AVi belongs to a set of feasible speeds, V =
{v¯1, v¯2, . . . , v¯ f }. The cost of the trip for AVi on a road segment L j, where j = 1,2, . . . ,m,
denoted by C
L j
sv (i), explicitly models the idling times of AVs. For AVi, the cost of travel-
ling over road segment L j incurred by choosing a time indexed sequence of velocities,
sv, is defined as follows:
C
L j
sv (i) =
{
ti i f stop
0 i f no stop (1)
where ti is the idling time of AVi at the TL positioned at the end of road segment L j.
The total cost for AVi, incurred over a path P(p0i, p f i) that is composed of the road
segments LP1 , . . . ,L
P
NP ∈ L (sequentially), is the summation of idling times at all TLs
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along the path, i.e.,
CPsv(i) =
NP
∑
j=1
C
LPj
sv (i). (2)
where NP is the number of TLs on the path P, and sv denotes the sequence of velocities
for road segment LPj . sv is the concatenation of sv1, . . . ,svNP . To provide a sub-optimal
solution to the above overall task, we follow a decentralized approach and consider
each road segment L j ∈ L of the locality separately. We propose a ”Time Token Allo-
cation Algorithm” for the TL and a cooperative distributed conflict resolution scheme
for the vehicles in each such L j.
For player AVi, the optimal speed value in the set of possible speeds may lead to a
time token within the green light, allocated by the TL, τi. The time token τi is the index
of a time window assigned by the TL using the Time Token Allocation Algorithm. This
means that for player AVi, the cost associated with the time token τi is the minimum
(e.g., player AVi will pass through the TL without stopping, C
L j
sv (i) = 0).
We define a cooperative speed optimization game, G. In this game, AVs with con-
flicting allocated time tokens agree to take certain speed actions to resolve the conflict.
Thus, for each player AVi, there is a finite non-empty set of speed actions V . There is an
idling time cost, C
L j
sv (i), associated with each sequence of actions sv. Action sequences
are associated with a preference relationship such that C
L j
sv∗(i)<C
L j
sv (i) means sv∗  sv j
(i.e., the sequence of actions sv∗ is preferred over that sv as it incurs less cost). As such,
the speed optimization game is represented as G = (n,V,C).
2.3 Stability of the Speed Optimization Game
In the speed optimization re-planning game (Definition 1), the chosen actions of AVs
are considered pure strategies, and therefore, there always exists pure equilibrium
where no AV wishes to unilaterally change its optimal solution. However, this is true
only for non-strictly competitive games. As the game progresses, AVs compete to gain
resources such that one AV’s gain is another AV’s loss.
A mixed strategy game, which always has a mixed equilibrium, is a game in which
the strategies available to the players are not deterministic but are regulated by prob-
abilistic rules [25]. Thus, from Definition 1, it is concluded that there is a probability
distribution over all the strategies available to every AV in the game. Hence, the speed
optimization re-planning game, as described in Definition 1, is a mixed strategy game
for which a mixed equilibrium always exists.
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Figure 2: Schematic depiction of the cooperative speed optimization framework.
3 The Proposed Cooperative Speed Optimization Frame-
work
Schematics of the Cooperative Speed Optimization Framework (CSOF) we propose to
solve the speed optimization re-planning game is provided in Fig. 2. This framework
consists of three modules to cover issues of (i) AV rational speed optimization, (ii)
information and conflict recognition, and (iii) cooperative speed optimization decision
making. However, before proceeding to the core of the proposed scheme, we address a
few issues with respect to the safety constraints of consecutive AVs on the roadway.
3.1 Car Following Model
The CSOF is designed to function on multiple-lane roadways only. A car-following
model is defined with two essential rules. First, AVs using the CSOF in free motion
can smoothly overtake each other on the roadway to comply to certain speed actions re-
sulting from their interaction and cooperation. Second, under certain traffic conditions
such as when overtaking is not possible, a safe following distance between consecutive
AVs is maintained. Consecutive AVs are modeled to maintain a minimum time gap of
two seconds in order to avoid collision [26]. All the AVs are identical in length and
have an average length of 5meters. The reaction time of AVs to the sudden deceleration
of the traffic ahead is assumed to be 1.10seconds [27].
3.2 Autonomous Vehicle Speed Optimization Module
The objective of this module is to provide each player (vehicle), AVi, with the opti-
mal speed at every time step t. Based on the Time to Intersection T T Ii and using a
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Time Token Allocation Algorithm, the TL may allocate τi to AVi, where τi is an integer
value indicating the index of a time window during which AVi can pass the intersec-
tion smoothly. The speed vi(t) of AVi at time step t is a function of the traffic density
D(L j) on road segment L j. [28] justified the linearity of the relation between traffic
density and speed under mild generic assumptions, concluding that as traffic concen-
tration/density increases, speed decreases. As such, some definitions are stated.
• The maximum speed AVi can travel at, vmax, will only occur when there are no
other vehicles on the roadway.
• In general, the speed of AVi goes to zero as the road reaches the maximum den-
sity, vi(t) converges to 0 as D(L j) converges to Dmax(L j).
Therefore, considering a linear relation between the traffic density and speed, the speed
vi(t) of AVi with respect to the traffic density D(L j) on road segment L j is
vi(t) = vmax
(
1− D(L j)
Dmax(L j)
)
(3)
AVi is allocated a token τi only if T T Ii falls within the upcoming green-light time,
i.e., T T Ii ≤ Rg or Rr < T T Ii ≤ Rr +Tg where Rg and Rr are the remaining green-light
and red-light times respectively. For AVi approaching a TL, the speed that minimizes
AV ′i s idling time cost is found as follows:
3.2.1 Light is Green
As AVi receives upcoming signal information from the TL, indicating that the current
light is green, there are three possible cases in terms of T T Ii and Rg:
• Case 1: T T Ii ≤ Rg. In this case, using the current speed, AVi will be able to pass
through within the remaining green-light time. The TL allocates a time token τi
to AVi. Thereby, AVi maintains its speed to pass during the assigned time token.
si = vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ di(t)/ai
vi(t)≤ di(t)/bi
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
where T T Ii = di(t)/vi(t), vi(t) is the speed of AVi at time step t, di(t) is the
distance of AVi to the stop line of the TL at time step t, si is the optimal speed of
AVi at time step t + 1, and vmax and vmin are the maximum and minimum speed
7
limits on the road segment respectively, while ai and bi represent the lower and
upper boundaries of the allocated time token respectively.
ai = (τi−1) 1µ (4)
bi = τi
1
µ
(5)
where µ is the departure rate in veh/sec.
• Case 2: Rg + Tr ≥ T T Ii > Rg. In this case, the vehicle is not allocated a time
token, and the speed of the vehicle is optimized over the distance to the TL so
that T T Ii is sufficient to meet the next green light.
si = min vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ di(t)/(Rg+Tr +Tq)
vi(t)≤ di(t)/(Rg+Tr +Tg)
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
where Tq is the time needed to clear all the vehicles in the queue, and it is found
as follows:
Tq =
n(t)
µ
(6)
where n(t) denotes the number of vehicles currently in the queue. In addition,
if the current speed does not allow AVi to be part of the green-light time but
the maximum speed of the roadway does, the speed optimization system will
accelerate the speed of AVi such that it is allocated a token.
si = max vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ di(t)/ai
vi(t)≤ di(t)/bi
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
• Case 3: Rg+Tr +Tg ≥ T T Ii > Rg+Tr. In this case, AVi will maintain its current
speed as T T Ii leads AVi to be part of the green-light time of the next cycle;
However, AVi will not yet be allocated a time token.
si = vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
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3.2.2 Light is Red
If the information received by the vehicle from the TL indicates that the current light
is red, there are three possible cases in terms of T T Ii and Rr:
• Case 1: T T Ii < Rr. In this case, AVi will not be allocated a time token, and its
speed is optimized such that it will meet the next green light.
si = min vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ di(t)/(Rr +Tq)
vi(t)≤ di(t)/(Rr +Tg)
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
• Case 2: Rr < T T Ii ≤ Rr +Tg. In this case, AVi is allocated a time token within
the upcoming green-light time.
si = vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ di(t)/(Rr +ai)
vi(t)≤ di(t)/(Rr +bi)
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
• Case 3: T T Ii > Rr +Tg. In this case, AVi is not allocated a time token and its
speed is optimized to meet the green-light time of the next cycle.
si = min vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≥ di(t)/(Rr +Tg+Tr +Tq)
vi(t)≤ di(t)/(Rr +Tr +2Tg)
vi(t)≥ vmin
vi(t)≤ vmax
3.2.3 Energy Consumption Model
All the AVs involved in the cooperative process are assumed to be Electric Autonomous
Vehicles (EAVs); therefore, the energy consumption model presented in [29] has been
modified to compute the instant energy consumed by every AV at time step t. The total
energy cost consumed by AVi at time step t consists of multiple sub-costs as follows:
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• Potential Consumed/Gained Energy: the potential energy ECPi (t) at time step t is
consumed from the battery during the uphill travel and is gained into the battery
during the downhill travel. The potential consumed and gained energies are
ECPCi (t) =
1
η
[m g u(t)] (7)
ECPGi (t) =−
1
η
[m g u(t)] (8)
where η is the efficiency of AVi, m is the mass of AVi, g is the gravity factor, and
u(t) is the elevation of the road segment at time step t.
• Loss of Energy: the loss of energy at time step t, which is always consumed from
the battery, occurs due to aerodynamic and rolling resistances.
EClossi (t) =
1
η
[ fr m g vi(t)+
1
2
ρ A dr v3i (t)] (9)
where fr is the friction coefficient, ρ is the air density coefficient, A is the cross
sectional area of AVi, and dr is the air drag coefficient.
• Acceleration/Deceleration Energy: the acceleration energy ECaci (t) at time step
t is consumed from the battery as AVi accelerates to a higher speed while the
deceleration energy ECdci (t) at time step t is recuperated and stored into the
battery as AVi comes to a lower speed.
ECaci (t) =
1
η
Pwri
di(t)
vi(t)− vi(t−1) (10)
ECdci (t) =−
1
η
Pwri
di(t)
vi(t)− vi(t−1) (11)
where Pwri is the power of the electric motor of AVi.
• Energy Consumed by On-Board Electric Devices: this energy is not path related
and is consumed directly from the battery at time step t by the on-board electric
devices such as air conditioner, windshield wipers, etc.
ECedi (t) =
n
∑
j=1
Pedi ( j) t
ed
i ( j) (12)
where Pedi ( j) is the power withdrawn at time step t by the electric device j and
tedi ( j) is the time that device j takes in use.
Therefore, the total energy cost consumed by AVi at time step t is computed as
ECTi (t) = [EC
PC
i (t)+EC
PG
i (t)+EC
loss
i (t)
+ECaci (t)+EC
dc
i (t)]
(13)
10
3.3 Information and Conflict Recognition Module
In this module, if two or more players have been allocated the same time token, the TL
informs them that they have a conflict. Players with conflicting tokens communicate
with each other to share their strategies and associated costs. Consequently, they start
to negotiate to find a binding agreement based on which they can cooperate and agree
on certain speed actions. Once an agreement is reached, all the players abide by the
rules to apply those actions.
3.4 Cooperative Decision Making Module
The cooperative game notion in this module is based on the assumption that players can
reach a binding agreement with which they commit to apply certain strategic actions.
As players are assumed to be rational, if the idling time cost to a player is greater
than what it would have been without cooperation, then the rationality assumption is
violated. Therefore, the following rationality axiom is stated.
Axiom 1 At time step t, there exists an optimal strategy vk for player AVi such that
C
L j
vk (i) ≤ C
L j
v j (i), ∀ k, j ∈ V (i.e., the cost associated with this optimal strategy is less
than or equal to that associated with any other strategy player AVi can take). However,
player AVi is free to choose any other strategy that might yield a higher cost, but only
in exchange for a reward.
The TL allocates time tokens to the players using Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, V IN
is the AV identification number, Nq is the number of vehicles currently in the queue,
T sd is the slot duration (i.e., time token duration), and T slot is the time token location
in the TL memory. According to this algorithm, the TL gives priority in allocating
tokens to the queued AVs. The rest of the green light time is segmented as tokens
and offered to the approaching AVs. Players with conflicting tokens will list the costs
caused by the conflict rather than the expected ones. It is assumed that each AV has
a mode property, which may take one of three values at a time: Rush Mode, Normal
Mode, or Relaxed Mode.
• Rush Mode: this mode is used by the AV for urgent and emergency situations
(e.g., must be in the hospital shortly).
• Normal Mode: this mode is used by the AV when there is no emergency; the AV
may yield the road to others.
• Relaxed Mode: this mode is used by the AV when there is plenty of time. The
AV would yield the road to other vehicles comfortably.
Each mode is represented by a scalar value. For instance, the mode values may be 0,
1, and 2 for modes Relaxed, Normal, and Rush respectively. Players will first play the
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Algorithm 1 : Time Token Allocation Algorithm for a Single Roadway
Input: V INi,T T Ii ; Output: τi
if Light is Green then
if (T T Ii ≤ Rg) then
for j = Nq+1 : Ndep do
a = T sd ∗ ( j−1);
b = T sd ∗ j;
if (T T Ii ≥ a & T T Ii ≤ b) then
T slot(1, j) =V INi;
τi = j;
break;
end if
end for
else
τi = 0;
end if
else
if (T T Ii < Rr) then
τi = 0;
else if (T T Ii > Rr +(T sd ∗Nq) & T T Ii ≤ Rr +Tg) then
for j = Nq+1 : Ndep do
a = Rr +T sd ∗ ( j−1);
b = Rr +T sd ∗ j;
if (T T Ii ≥ a && T T Ii ≤ b) then
T slot(1, j) =V INi;
τi = j;
break;
end if
end for
else
τi = 0;
end if
end if
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game based on the mode type. The one using the mode with the highest value will win
(i.e., use the current time token), while the one using the mode with a smaller value
will lose (i.e., slow down its own speed and request a different time token). However,
the TL will grant the loser a credit point and deduct a credit point from the winner. The
winner of the mode-based game is determined using the following formula.
AVwinner = max(M(AV1),M(AV2)) (14)
If both players are using the same mode, they will decide the winner based on the
credit points that they have. The one with the most will eventually win the game.
Again, a credit point is deducted from the winner, and a credit point is granted to the
loser. In this case, the winner is determined using the following formula.
AVwinner = max(CP(AV1),CP(AV2)) (15)
If it happens that both players have the same mode value and number of credit
points, a random number-generation procedure between the TL and players is con-
ducted to resolve the issue. Basically, each of the players as well as the TL will gener-
ate a random number. The one whose generated number is closer to that of the TL will
win the current time token but lose a credit point. The other will gain a credit point and
request a different token. The winner of the game is determined using the following
formula.
RN1 = |RN(T L)−RN(AV1)|
RN2 = |RN(T L)−RN(AV2)|
AVwinner =
{
AV1 i f RN1 < RN2
AV2 otherwise
(16)
To further clarify the cooperative speed optimization game, an example of two AVs
approaching a TL is presented next.
Example 1 Recall the problem statement example (Fig. 1) and assume that the TL
has just turned green for the East-West directions. After communicating with the
TL, the two AVs, approaching the TL from the West, have been allocated, at time
step t, the same and only-remaining time token. Both vehicles will have only two
strategies to choose from. For instance, player AV ′1s available strategies are V
AV1 =
{v1(t)AV1 ,v2(t)AV1}, where using strategy v1(t)AV1 corresponds to using the current time
token and using strategy v2(t)AV1 corresponds to minimizing its own speed and request-
ing a token within the next green light. Table 1 has been constructed to clarify the game
setting.
When both players choose the same strategy resulting in the use of strategy profile
(C
L j
v1(t)
(1),C
L j
v1(t)
(2)) or (C
L j
v2(t)
(1),C
L j
v2(t)
(2)), the cost is high for both of them. When
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Table 1: Action and response table of a two-player game
Players/Strategies v1(t)AV2 v2(t)AV2
v1(t)AV1 (C
L j
v1(t)
(1),C
L j
v1(t)
(2)) (C
L j
v1(t)
(1),C
L j
v2(t)
(2))
v2(t)AV1 (C
L j
v2(t)
(1),C
L j
v1(t)
(2)) (C
L j
v2(t)
(1),C
L j
v2(t)
(2))
either of the two players chooses the optimal strategy while the other chooses the sec-
ond preferred strategy resulting in the use of strategy profile (C
L j
v2(t)
(1),C
L j
v1(t)
(2)) or
(C
L j
v1(t)
(1),C
L j
v2(t)
(2)), the game is stable. In this case, the strategy profile is an NE and
Pareto Optimal (PO). Hence, the binding agreement between the players would en-
force the idea that they should choose different strategies. A numerical representation
of such a game may be shown as in Table 2.
Table 2: Action and response table of a two-player game
Players/Strategies v1(t)AV2 v2(t)AV2
v1(t)AV1 (4,4) (0,2)
v2(t)AV1 (2,0) (3,3)
3.4.1 Multi-Phase Cooperative Speed Optimization Game
When more than two vehicles are allocated the same token, a multi-phase cooperative
procedure is implemented to resolve the conflict. The multi-phase game is composed
of multiple two-player sub-games. In each sub-game, only two players cooperate to
find their acceptable joint strategies. Then, the winners of the two-player sub-games
will play another sub-game and so on until the winner of the only available time token
is determined.
4 Cooperative Credit-Point Bargaining
A cooperative game is a tuple of two elements (N, f ), where N = {1,2, ...n}, is a finite
set of AVs willing to trade credit points, and f is a function that maps subsets of N to
numbers. If S is a subset of N, such that S ⊆ N, then f (S) is the total value induced
when the members of S come together to trade credit points. For further clarification,
an example is presented next.
Example 2 Assume that there are three AVs, N = {AV1,AV2,AV3}, heading toward a
TL, where AV1 is a seller of a credit point, while AV2 and AV3 are two buyers. Consider
the case that AV1 has only one credit point to sell at $3 and each of the buyers contem-
plates to buy at most one credit point. AV2 is willing to pay $5, while AV3 is willing to
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pay $8. The characteristic function, f , of this game is defined as follows:
f (AV1) = f (AV2) = f (AV3) = 0
f (AV1,AV2) = 5−3 = 2
f (AV1,AV3) = 8−3 = 5
f (AV2,AV3) = 0
f (AV1,AV2,AV3) = 8−3 = 5
4.1 The Marginal Contribution
As introduced by [30], the marginal contribution concept provides the analytical rea-
soning of bargaining. Let N\AVi be the subset of N that contains all the AVs except
AVi. The marginal contribution of AVi is f (N)− f (N\AVi) and denoted by MCAVi . For
example, the marginal contributions of the previously defined game are
MCAV1 = f (N)− f (N\AV1) = 5−0 = 5
MCAV2 = f (N)− f (N\AV2) = 5−5 = 0
MCAV3 = f (N)− f (N\AV3) = 5−2 = 3
Definition 2 An allocation, (xav1 ,xav2 , ...,xavn), which is a collection of numbers rep-
resenting the division of the overall value, where xavi indicates the value received by
AVi, is individually rational if xavi ≥ f (AVi), ∀ i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}.
Definition 3 An allocation, (xav1 ,xav2 , ...,xavn), is efficient if ∑
n
i=1 xavi = f (N)
Definition 4 An individually rational and efficient allocation, (xav1 ,xav2 , ...,xavn), sat-
isfies the Marginal Contribution Principle if xavi ≤MCAVi , ∀ i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}.
4.2 The Core
The core is the solution concept of coalitional games, containing all the possible al-
locations (i.e., divisions of the overall value) [33]. Let x(S) be the sum of the values
received by the AVs in the subset S, such that
x(S) =∑
i∈S
xavi (17)
In addition, let the marginal contribution of a subset S of N be MCS = f (N)− f (N\S).
According to [30], the core has two main conditions.
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Theorem 1 An allocation, (xav1 ,xav2 , ...,xavn), is part of the core if it is efficient and
for every subset S of N, x(S)≥ f (S) is satisfied.
Proof 1 An allocation that belongs to the core of the game is individually rational.
let S = {AVi} for i = 1,2, . . . ,n
Noticeably, x{AVi}= xavi both represent the values received by AVi.
Therefore, the condition x(S)≥ f (S) is in fact the individual rationality condition xavi ≥
f (AVi).

Theorem 2 An allocation, (xav1 ,xav2 , ...,xavn), is part of the core if it is efficient and
for every subset S of N, x(S)≤MCS is satisfied.
Proof 2 An allocation that belongs to the core of the game satisfies x(S)≤MCS.
Using the individual rationality condition, consider N\S
x(N\S)≥ f (N\S) (18)
x(N\S) = x(N)− x(S) (19)
By efficiency, we have
x(N) = f (N). (20)
Substituting (19) into (18)
x(N)− x(S)≥ f (N\S) (21)
Substituting (20) into (21)
x(S)≤ f (N)− f (N\S) = MCS (22)

Therefore, the core of the cooperative credit point bargaining game is defined as fol-
lows:
{(xav1 ,xav2 , ...,xavn) : ∑
i∈N
xavi = f (N), and
x(S)≥ f (S), ∀ S ∈ N}
(23)
To find the core elements, we propose that the problem is formulated as a Constraint
Satisfaction Problem (CSP). The most common CSP solving techniques are Backtrack-
ing Search and Local Search [35]. For instance, the feasible allocations in Example 2
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are the points (xav1 ,xav2 ,xav3), such that
xav1 + xav2 + xav3 = 5
sub ject to :
xav1 + xav2 ≥ 2
xav1 + xav3 ≥ 5
xav2 + xav3 ≥ 0
xav1 ≥ 0, xav2 ≥ 0, xav3 ≥ 0
The domains of xav1 , xav2 and xav3 are
dom(xav1) = {any value between 0 and 5}
dom(xav2) = {any value between 0 and 5}
dom(xav3) = {any value between 0 and 5}
By solving this problem as a CSP, the core of the game is
Core = {(xav1 ,xav2 ,xav3) :
i=3
∑
i=1
xavi = f (N), and
x(S)≥ f (S), ∀ S ∈ N}
Core = {($2,$0,$3)($3,$0,$2)($4,$0,$1)($5,$0,$0)}.
5 Simulation Tests
Simulation was conducted to test and validate the performance of the CSOF. The simu-
lation was performed in MATLAB using the concept of Object Oriented Programming
(OOP). A two-lane roadway sub-network containing three SIs was chosen in Water-
loo, ON, Canada, to conduct the simulation (Fig. 3). The SIs are as follows: SI1,
Westmount Road North with Columbia Street West; SI2, Westmount Road North with
Bearinger Road; and SI3, Northfield Drive West with Weber Street North. Every SI
has a static TL system such that TL1, TL2, and TL3 for SI1, SI2, and SI3 respectively.
Each TL control system has a two-phase cycle where the East-West roadways are one
phase and South-North roadways are the other phase. Each phase has a signal design
of Green-Yellow-Red; however, for simplicity, the yellow-light time is assumed to be
part of the green-light-time duration. To enhance safety, one second of red-light time
is given to all the roadways between every two consecutive phases.
In order to overcome randomization and capture the real behaviour of traffic, the
simulation was run for more than three hours. The maximum and minimum speed
limits on any roadway in the network are vmax = 60km/hour and vmin = 10km/hour
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Figure 3: A sub-network with three signalized intersections.
respectively where the highest volume of traffic a road segment may have is assumed
to be 85percent of the maximum density, Dmax(L j). AVs are generated randomly into
the network based on Poisson Distribution. The generated AVs travel at an average
speed of 50km/hour until they get within the activation distance (i.e., the distance at
which the vehicles get within the V2I communication range and start cooperating).
The activation distance was fixed at 500meters. The performance of the CSOF is com-
pared to a Non-Cooperative Speed Optimization algorithm (NCSO) (i.e., the vehicles
individually compute their optimal speeds). Once they are within range, AVs start
conducting speed optimization based on the functioning optimization technique (i.e.,
CSOF or NCSO) to have a chance of meeting the green light when they arrive at the
TL.
Figs. 4, 5, and 6 report the results of the total average idling time, total average num-
ber of stops, and total average energy consumption at SI1, SI2, and SI3, comparing the
CSOF to the NCSO algorithm. As can be seen, the CSOF outperformed the NCSO
by achieving lower average idling times and average number of stops. This is because
the conflicting passing times of vehicles through the intersections are resolved by the
CSOF. All the AVs using the CSOF, meant to arrive during the green-light time, are al-
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Figure 4: Total average idling time at SI1, SI2, and SI3.
Figure 5: Total average number of stops at SI1, SI2, and SI3.
located time tokens before reaching the intersections. As such, when they arrive, they
are able to pass through smoothly during their allocated times. In addition, due to the
road and signal timing constraints, the AVs that could only arrive at the intersections
during the red-light times were not allocated time tokens before reaching the intersec-
tions. These AVs joined the queues with less waiting times. As mentioned previously,
the time needed to clear the queue is excluded from that available as time tokens to the
approaching AVs. It can be noticed from the result figures that for the two compared
techniques, as the number of AVs approaching the intersections increases, the average
idling times and number of stops become greater, and the improvement achieved by
the CSOF in minimizing the average idling times is more significant. The reductions
in average idling times that have been achieved by the CSOF when compared to the
NCSO for SI1, SI2, and SI3 are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5 respectively.
In addition, the CSOF has achieved lower average energy consumption. In the case
of CSOF, as soon as a vehicle is allocated a time token, it maintains its speed so that
it passes the intersection smoothly during its allocated token. Hence, in general there
are less speed variations resulting from the AVs using the CSOF. To prove this, Fig. 7
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Figure 6: Total average energy consumption of vehicles approaching SI1, SI2, and SI3.
Figure 7: Speed trajectories of six vehicles approaching intersection 1, (a) vehicles using the CSOF, (b)
vehicles using the NCSO.
captures the speed trajectories of six AVs approaching SI1 from the Westmount Road
North direction from the moment they joined the activation distance of the CSOF until
they passed the stop line of the intersection. It is clear that on average, the reductions in
speed variations of AVs using the CSOF are not significant as compared to those using
the NCSO algorithm. As a result, the energy savings of AVs using the CSOF have not
been significant as reported in Fig. 6.
Furthermore, the total average idling time and number of stops achieved by the
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Figure 8: Activation distance analysis for intersection 2, (a) total average idling time, (b) total average
number of stops.
CSOF were investigated with respect to the V2I activation distance. SI2 was chosen
to conduct the investigation. It is assumed that the V2I communication radio is avail-
able in a range of up to 800meters away from the intersection, so it was varied from
300meters to 800meters in steps of 100meters. Fig. 8 depicts the total values of av-
erage idling time and average number of stops being achieved by the CSOF. As can
be seen, it is concluded that the optimal point of activation is found near 500meters.
At shorter distances, some AVs are forced to arrive during the red-light time due to
the fact that the time available to the AVs to get allocated tokens, or reallocated tokens
after playing a game, to adjust their speeds accordingly is not enough to result in low
average values of idling time and number of stops. At further activation distances, the
average values of idling time and number of stops are slightly increased but remain
near the optimal level.
Table 3: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 1.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
NCSO (sec) 0.829 3.831 4.301 5.55 5.967 6.262
CSOF (sec) 0.05 0.441 1.227 1.688 2.521 2.933
Reduction (%) 94 88 71 70 58 53
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Table 4: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 2.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
NCSO (sec) 0.388 0.888 2.299 2.754 3.614 4.632
CSOF (sec) 0.035 0.176 0.347 0.603 0.725 1.08
Reduction (%) 91 80 85 78 80 77
Table 5: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 3.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
NCSO (sec) 0.711 1.826 2.694 4.649 6.208 6.412
CSOF (sec) 0.044 0.159 0.483 1.084 1.727 2.878
Reduction (%) 94 91 82 77 72 55
6 Conclusion
This research has addressed the problem of minimizing the total average idling times
and number of stops for Electric Autonomous Vehicles (EAVs) approaching Signalized
Intersections (SIs). A Cooperative Speed Optimization Framework (CSOF) was pro-
posed. The proposed framework consists of three modules to tackle issues of individual
speed optimization, conflict recognition, and cooperative speed decision making. Sim-
ulation was conducted to investigate the performance of the CSOF in comparison with
a Non-Cooperative Speed Optimization (NCSO) algorithm. The simulation tested the
performance of the two techniques under various traffic conditions, showing that the
CSOF outperformed the NCSO in terms of minimizing the total average idling times,
number of stops, and energy consumption. Furthermore, the performance of the CSOF
was investigated in terms of the V2I communication range. It was concluded that the
EAVs using the CSOF could achieve the minimum values of total average idling times
and number of stops at a communication range activation near 500meters. The future
work of this research should investigate the scalability of the CSOF under various ge-
ometrical designs of SIs and TL phase/cycle settings. Moreover, the cooperation of
a dynamic traffic light system with the EAVs using the CSOF should be investigated
to achieve further minimization of average idling times, number of stops, and energy
consumption.
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